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Abstract
This paper presents a number of security and VO management capa-
bilities in a large-scale distributed Grid operating system. The capabilities
formed the basis of the design and implementation of a number of security
and VO management services in the system. The main aim of the paper
is to provide some idea of the various functionality cases that need to be
considered when designing similar large-scale systems in the future.
1 Introduction
Grid middleware has become an integral part of scientific computing. The
notion of Virtual Organization (VO) is used to scale the Grid to large numbers
of users and computing nodes. Synergies can be achieved by grouping users,
which share OS-specific, application-specific resources and computing nodes [9].
However, their use is yet to become widespread commercially. The complexity
of managing VOs and the difficulty assuring user and VO security are two major
barriers to such wider use. As a result of the criticality of the management of VO
membership and security, it is mandatory to consider such functionality at an
early stage of the software development lifecycle to ensure a safe implementation
of the system.
This paper presents the main security and VO management capabilities in
a large-scale Grid operating system called XtreemOS [6, 11]. These capabili-
ties are used by administrators, users and XtreemOS components to establish,
operate, evolve and terminate a Grid and the VOs within. The capabilities
define the relevant use cases in XtreemOS and help establish some idea about
what may be needed to manage security and VOs in a large-scale distributed
operating system.
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1.1 Overview of the XtreemOs Operating System
XtreemOS (www.xtreemos.eu) [6, 11] was an EU FP6 project, which aimed
at building a Grid-based distributed operating system that provided a single
abstraction of physical hardware and software services offered by a collection
of standalone Linux operating systems to users within a Grid. These operat-
ing systems could function collaboratively to support the utilisation of compu-
tational and storage resources regardless of the geographical location of their
users or machines. A major function of XtreemOS was to hide the complexity
of distributed resources dynamically aggregated from large-scale cross-domain
resource providers and to ensure the transparency of using such a distributed
operating system. Hence, similar to a standalone operating system, once a user
is registered with XtreemOS, it should be conceptually the same to utilise re-
sources from any machine that the system is composed of, regardless of whether
such resources have been recently added to the system or have been there before.
As illustrated in Figure 1 [6], XtreemOS is composed of two parts: the
XtreemOS foundation, called XtreemOS-F, and high level Grid services, called
XtreemOS-G. XtreemOS-F is a modified Linux kernel embedding support for
Virtual Organisations (VOs), where a VO in XtreemOS is a temporary col-
laboration among various Grid resource providers and resources for achieving
a specific goal. XtreemOS-F provides kernel level process checkpoint/restart
functionality. XtreemOS-G comprises several Grid OS distributed services to
deal with resource and application management in VOs, and is implemented
onto XtreemOS-F.
Figure 1: XtreemOS Software Architecture [6].
XtreemOS targets scalable and flexible management of dynamic VOs [5].
XtreemOS Grids spans over multiple administrative domains on different sites,
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comprising heterogeneous resources that can be shared by the participating
organisations. A Grid member can create a VO, for which he becomes the VO
owner. Any Grid member can request his registration in a given VO, subject
to the VO owner approval. Resources can be registered in VOs as well. The
VO owner defines policies stating permissions and usage rules for VO resources.
The Grid administrator also defines policies regulating what a Grid member
can do (for example, permission to create a VO). Resource owners in different
administrative domains may also define local policies for resource usage. Grid,
VO and local policies are enforced by the XtreemOS system.
The Application Execution Management (AEM) [2] services are in charge
of discovering, selecting and allocating resources for job execution, as well as
starting, controlling and monitoring jobs. Data management in XtreemOS is
achieved with the XtreemOS Grid file system – XtreemFS [15]. XtreemFS
federates multiple data stores located in different administrative domains and
provides secure access to stored files to VO members, whatever their location.
1.2 Virtual Organisation Lifecycle in XtreemOS
The VO lifecycle in XtreemOS consists of a number of phases:
• Grid Management: In this phase, site administrators willing to offer their
site resources to the Grid advertise the general site. At this stage, there
are no VOs formed yet.
• VO Creation: Once the XtreemOS Grid has been set-up in the previous
phase, VOs will be created at this phase and their structure and attributes
defined. However, VOs have not yet been populated at this stage.
• VO Evolution: After the creation of a VO, users, core services, resources
and policies can be added to and removed from it.
• VO Operation: A fully formed VO is operational, which means that users
can start utilising the VO’s resources.
• VO Termination: Finally, once the VO has achieved its goal/purpose,
it can be terminated by dissolving its membership and terminating any
outstanding jobs.
Each of these phases is implemented by means of a number of capabilities, which
define the functionality that the operating system provides in support of the
various use cases in each phase of the VO management lifecycle. And since
these capabilities also take the security of the system into account, we have
termed them the security and VO management capabilities in XtreemOS.
1.3 Structure of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview of
related work. In Section 3 we describe the structure of the XtreemOS security
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and VO Management services, the trust domains and the various actors involved.
We then introduce the security and VO management capabilities in Section 4.
Finally, in Section 5 we conclude the paper.
2 Related Work
Grid middleware systems, such as Globus (www.globus.org), provide several ex-
amples of VO management services. Of these, the two most popular ones are
VOMS (Virtual Organization Membership Service) [1] and CAS (Community
Authorization Service) [12]. VOMS [1] is an important VO reference implemen-
tation because it provides a popular approach for integrating VO information
(e.g. user roles in a VO) into node-level enforcement mechanisms. However,
managing VOMS effectively is an non-trivial task because authorization deci-
sions are often a result of a joint process between the VOMS server (participating
in the form of VOMS credentials) and nodes. Managing such decision making
process consistently and coherently can be non-trivial and may potentially have
scalability problems for large VOs with a significant number of resources. It also
makes it difficult to create new VOs and introduce new resources and members
dynamically.
CAS [12], on the other hand, builds on top of the Grid Security Infrastructure
(GSI) [8]. It takes control over the policy specification by explicitly spelling out
the relationship between VO users and resources. CAS represents a push model
of enforcing VO policies because its policy enforcement is decoupled from VO
information (e.g. user groups/roles). Therefore, it is comparatively easy to
create dynamic VOs using the CAS model. However, it is not always easy to
figure out what VO resources users need to use in advance. Overall, VOMS
and CAS represent two different ends of the spectrum. VOMS leans to a pull
model where access control is done at nodes by pulling policy information on
demand (i.e. from the VOMS), while the CAS model uses a push approach by
distributing the fine-grain control of community policy.
Generally, the VO management system in XtreemOS (XVOMS) is not com-
patible with other VO systems in production Grids, since it was designed with
Operating System architectures (rather than existing Grid middleware tech-
nologies) in mind. Hence, for example, it is not possible to use VOMS or CAS
instead of XVOMS.
The importance of incorporating special use cases for security in the de-
velopment lifecycle of computing systems has been highlighted in the past by
Tenday [14], who proposes the use of misuse cases and obligation use cases in
the software development lifecycle as a means for expressing security concerns at
the very beginning of the development process. Similarly, Firesmith [7] defines
some examples of such security use cases in the general context of computer
systems relevant to integrity, privacy and access control. In the context of Grid
systems, Rosado et al. [13] deploy reusable security use cases in defining the
requirements for mobile Grid environments.
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3 The Security and VO Management Model in
XtreemOS
In this section, we provide an overview here of the XtreemOS security and VO
management model in terms of the trust domains, actors and different services
involved.
3.1 Trust Domains
The security and VO management services in XtreemOS are based on three
main trust domains. These domains are described as follows:
• The Resource site domain: This includes sites that offer resources to the
Grid and any VOs formed out of the Grid.
• The User site domain: This includes sites that provide users of VOs who
will submit jobs to the resources included in those VOs.
• The Core site domain: This represents the core site in which the Security
and VO Management (and possibly other XtreemOS) services may be
running.
From the trust point of view, the Core site represents the root of trust for both
the Resource and User sites. In other words, a Core site must have a high level
of assurance since it will be running critical system components.
3.2 Actors
Having defined the main trust domains in the previous section, we now introduce
the main actors of the security and VO management services.
• The User : this actor is the user of VOs, who is also registered in the Grid
within which the VOs are created.
• The VO Administrator : this actor is a previous User who created a VO
and became the owner and administrator of that VO. Therefore, the VO
Administrator has full authority on managing the VO.
• The Resource Administrator : this is the actor owning the resources offered
to VOs. The actor could be either a whole site administrator or the owner
of one or more machines belonging to the site.
• The Grid Administrator : this actor is responsible for managing the core
XtreemOS security and VO management services.
These actors are shown in Figure 2, which also depicts to which trust domain
is each actor expected to operate.
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Figure 2: Actors and their trust domains in XtreemOS.
3.3 Core Security and VO Management Services
The core XtreemOS security and VO Management services are shown in Figure
3. These services consist of the XtreemOS VO Management Service (XVOMS),
	  
Figure 3: The XtreemOS security and VO management services and their trust
domains.
the Resource Certification Authority (RCA) and the VO Policy Service (VOPS).
Additionally, monitoring and auditing services can also be deployed across the
Core and resource sites to raise the level of assurance as to the general behaviour
of the system and its processes. However, we shall only focus here on the core
security and VO management services. Next, we describe each of these services
independently.
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3.3.1 XtreemOS VO Management Service (XVOMS)
The XVOMS [4] is a VO and trust management service whose architecture is
illustrated in Figure 4. XVOMS provides a logical grouping of the infrastructural
services needed to manage the entities involved in a VO and ensure a consistent
and coherent exploitation of the resources and capabilities inside the VO.
	  
Figure 4: Structure of the XtreemOS VO management service.
The XVOMS system consists of the following components:
The Root Certification Authority. This is a manual service that creates
the XtreemOS trust anchor, the root certificate, and uses it to certify the iden-
tity of core services within XtreemOS. This service can be performed oﬄine to
avoid compromise of the root private key. The certification of core services can
optionally be performed by the CDA service, described next.
The Credential Distribution Authority Server. This component, also
referred to as the CDA server, is responsible for distributing XtreemOS identity
certificates (XOS-Cert) to users. XOS-Cert are X509-based certificates [10]. The
CDA server may optionally be configured to also provide service certificates,
certifying the identity of XtreemOS core services.
The Credential Distribution Authority Client. This is a client-side pro-
gram that interfaces with the CDA server, in the case when it is not possible to
use the VO Web Frontend interface.
The Registration Manager. This component is responsible for managing
the initial registration of users and RCAs with the XtreemOS system.
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The VO Manager. This component controls the lifecycle of the VO as de-
scribed in Section 1.2. There is one instance of a VO Manager component
running per each live VO, and its functions are controlled by the user who is
the VO’s Administrator
The XVOMS Database. This is the main database in XVOMS in which all
the information regarding the user and RCA registrations, VO membership and
lifecycle is stored.
The VO Web Frontend. This is a Web-based interface to the functionality
offered by XVOMS.
3.3.2 Resource Certification Authority (RCA)
The RCA [4] is a certification authority at the level of administrative sites offer-
ing resources to XtreemOS VOs. The RCA consists of the following components,
as shown in Figure 5. The RCA is responsible for bootstrapping trust in the
individual resource domains. This trust is used by other XtreemOS components
(e.g. AEM services) to be able to submit jobs to resources.
	  
Figure 5: Structure of the XtreemOS RCA service.
The following paragraphs give an overview of the main logical components
of the RCA.
The RCA server. This is the main component, which provides the function-
ality of the RCA. The server is responsible for issuing certificates to resources.
The RCA client. The RCA client is a client-side program that can interact
with the RCA server.
The RCA Web Frontend. The RCA Web Frontend is a Web-based interface
to the RCA server, which is an alternative to the RCA client program.
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The RCA database. The RCA database stores the state of resources in each
administrative domain. This state could indicate that a resource is unregistered
with the Grid, registered with the Grid and if so, whether it is currently offered
to any VOs in the Grid. The main interface to the RCA database is through
the RCA server functionality.
3.3.3 VO Policy Service (VOPS)
The VOPS [4] is used to manage and enforce VO policies. The service consists
of the following components, as shown in Figure 6. VOPS is composed of the
	  
Figure 6: Structure of the XtreemOS VO Policy Service.
following components.
The Policy Enforcement Point. The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is
where the users’ requests are intercepted in order for these requests to be checked
and appropriate decisions enforced on the requests. The user requests may carry
user credentials regarding their attributes.
The Policy Decision Point. The Policy Decision Point (PDP) is the com-
ponent which enforces the security policies on user requests. The PDP contains
the logic that is computed against the policies and the users requests.
The Policy Information Point. The Policy Information Point (PIP) is a
component of VOPS which queries information about the request arriving from
a user, additional user credentials and information about the context of the
request and the system.
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The Policy Administration Point. The Policy Administration Point (PAP)
allows the site or resource administrator to add, delete and update policies in
the policy store.
The Policy Store. The Policy Store (PS) is a database containing all the
policies related to the different resources.
4 Security and VO Management Capabilities
This section presents the different capabilities associated with the security and
VO management functionality in XtreemOS. These capabilities are organised
around the XtreemOS VO lifecycle of Section 1.2. The capabilities represent
“what” the system can do in terms of its services outlined in Section 3.3. All
of these capabilities were implemented as API using Java language and they
can be run through command line interface, and in some cases, through a Web
interface (e.g. Capabilities 4.4.1, 4.4.2).
4.1 Grid Management Capabilities
The Grid management capabilities include the registration and removal of users
and RCAs with the Grid, the registration of local resources with RCAs, the
set-up of Root Certificate Authority (CA) and running the various security and
VO management services. These capabilities are depicted in Figure 7 and below
we describe each of these in more detail.
	  
Figure 7: The Grid Management Capabilities.
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One can divide the Grid Management capabilities into the following two
broad categories: setting-up the Grid infrastructure and populating the Grid.
The first set of capabilities is related to the actual set-up of a new XtreemOS-
based Grid infrastructure. This is the very first step in the VO lifecycle.
4.1.1 Configuring and Creating the Root CA
This capability is concerned with the creation and configuration of the root
of trust in a XtreemOS Grid, i.e. the Root CA. The capability is performed
by the Grid Administrator, who is responsible for generating the private key
for the Root CA and the public key certificate, which is later used for signing
any Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) from other services. In the ideal case,
the machine (node) running the Root CA must be of high assurance and not
networked, to minimise security vulnerabilities. The public key certificate itself
however is placed on a networked core machine ready and available for public
distribution when needed. Since this is an early step in configuring the Grid,
it must be executed before any of the Core Services are configured and started
running.
4.1.2 Creating the XVOMS Database
The second capability is related to the creation of the XVOMS database, which
will later hold all the information related to the XtreemOS VOs as well as the
Grid membership. Again, this capability is performed by the Grid Administra-
tor, who initialises and sets the database ready for use. This also includes setting
up a password for the database, which could be the same password assigned to
the Grid Administrator (root login). Similar to the previous capability, this is
an early step in configuring the Grid and therefore it must be executed before
any of the other Core Services are configured and started running.
4.1.3 Setting-Up and Running Core Services
Once the Root CA and the XVOMS database components have been set-up and
initialised, it is now possible to set-up and run the Core Services in a XtreemOS
Grid. The actors responsible for this capability are the Grid Administrator
as well as the Resource Administrator for any organisations willing to join the
Grid and provide resources. Once this capability has been executed, the Core
Services of the XtreemOS system will be up and running ready for users. This
also implies that their security credentials have been created. The Root CA
certificate and the CDA (Credential Distribution Authority) certificate are con-
sidered public certificates and therefore are placed on a networked node ready
for distribution. Additionally, the Root CA certificate should be made available
for downloading from the home page of the VO Web Frontend.
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4.1.4 Obtaining Public Certificates
This capability is initiated by a User who wishes to obtain the public key certifi-
cate(s) of one or more of the Core Services from the Root CA. As a precondition,
the User is expected to have the public key certificate of the trusted certifica-
tion authorities installed on his/her system and providing a way for checking the
trust and security of the communications with the Root CA. Once the capability
is successfully executed, the User will have obtained the public key certificates
of the requested Core Services in the XtreemOS system.
4.1.5 Processing Certificate Requests
This capability is performed by the Grid Administrator in order to generate
certificates verifying the identity of a Core Service when requested by a User as
per the previous capability. A CSR (Certificate Signing Request) is converted
into a public key certificate, which is sent to the originator of the request.
The next set of capabilities are related to the addition of users and resources
to an already set-up XtreemOS Grid.
4.1.6 Registering Users
The first capability for populating the Grid aims at allowing Users to register
to the Grid. In concrete terms, this means that a User can request to have a
Grid account upon providing their new account details (user name, password,
real name, organisation and email address.) The capability is executed on the
Registration Manager (part of XVOMS) by the User via the VO Web Frontend
interface. A precondition is that the XVOMS (XtreemOS VO Management Ser-
vice) database must already have been set-up and configured ready for receiving
information on Grid membership. Once the capability has been successfully ex-
ecuted, the User will have an account on the database and he/she will end up
sharing a password with the Registration Manager. The success of this capabil-
ity is dependant on the completion of the next capability on approving Users.
4.1.7 Approving Users
This capability is applied by the Grid Administrator, who will react upon re-
ceiving a request to join the Grid from some User as per the previous capability.
The Grid Administrator will make sure that the request itself is valid (e.g. the
organisation to which the User belongs is admissible to the Grid). It also im-
plies that the Grid Administrator can contact the User by email or telephone to
request further details before approving their request. If the Grid Administra-
tor is satisfied with the request and the associated information about the User,
he/she will then approve the request leading to a successful completion of this
capability as well as the previous one.
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4.1.8 Removing Users
The Grid Administrator can also remove an already registered User from the
XtreemOS Grid. As a result, the User will no longer be capable of logging
in to the Grid, joining VOs or submitting any computational jobs. Another
form of this capability is that the User himself decides to leave the Grid by
either sending a request to the Grid Administrator or by executing the relevant
commands on the VO Web Frontend.
4.1.9 Registering RCA
This is the first capability related to the population of the Grid with RCAs
representing resource administrative domains. The capability allows a Resource
Administrator to request the join of a RCA to a Grid from the Grid Admin-
istrator. When successfully completed, the capability will allow the Resource
Administrator and the Registration Manager to share a password for managing
the RCA’s account in XVOMS. However, its success is pretty much dependant
on the following capability.
4.1.10 Approving RCA
This capability will allow the Grid Administrator to a request submitted via
the previous capability for joining a RCA to the Grid. Once this is achieved,
the RCA will obtain an account on XVOMS for its membership in the Grid and
future VOs. Similarly, the Root CA is informed of the decision in order to link
the RCA to its chain of trust.
4.1.11 Confirming RCA Approval
This capability is for the Grid Administrator to inform the Resource Adminis-
trator of the decision of joining the RCA to the Grid. This is necessary as the
Resource Administrator can now start applying the following two capabilities
related to the offering of resources to the Grid and its future VOs.
4.1.12 Registering Resources with the RCA
Since the RCA is the main gateway for local resources (machines, nodes, ser-
vices) to join the Grid, this capability is an essential one that allows the Resource
Administrator to register the local resources with the RCA. As a result, the re-
source details will be recorded on the RCA and the resource will be issued with
an identity certificate that it can use to identify itself to other Grid resources
or users.
4.1.13 Removing Resources from the RCA
Finally, the last capability in the Grid management capabilities is related to the
removal of any resources wishing to exit the XtreemOS Grid. As a precondition,
it must be the case that the resource is already registered through the previous
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capability, and that there are no pending jobs related to the Grid users currently
running on the resource. Once the resource has been removed from the RCA
list of Grid membership, any subsequent requests for its identity certificate or
any other machine attributes certificates will fail. Upon successful completion of
this capability, the resource is considered to be outside of the XtreemOS Grid.
4.2 VO Creation Capabilities
The VO creation capabilities facilitate the setting-up of VOs, their attributes
and their policies. These capabilities are not concerned with populating VOs
with users and resources, which is considered to be part of the VO evolution
phase discussed later. Figure 8 represents the VO creation capabilities discussed
next.
	  
Figure 8: The VO Creation Capabilities.
4.2.1 Creating VOs
The first capability is to allow a User to create a VO (Virtual Organization)
using either the command line interface of the VO Manager (part of the XVOMS
service) or the VO Web Frontend. The VO must not have existed already and
the success of completing this capability will result in the creation of the new
VO. The new VO is identified by means of a unique identifier, which is bound to
the User as the owner and the administrator of the VO. The VO is also provided
with a name for the readability of its users. The details of the new VO will be
stored on the XVOMS database.
4.2.2 Adding VO Attributes
The second and last capability in this part of the VO lifecycle is related to
the definition of the VO attributes for new VOs created during the previous
capability. These attributes define the ”structure of the VO” in terms of its
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groups and the roles within those groups. This capability can only be performed
by the owner of the VO.
4.3 VO Evolution Capabilities
The next phase in the lifecycle of a XtreemOS VO is the evolution phase. VO
evolution capabilities facilitate the management of users, resources and policies
within VOs. The following sections describe the various capabilities grouped by
users, resources and policy management.
User Management. The first set of VO evolution capabilities is related to
the management of users as shown in Figure 9. User management includes the
following specific capabilities.
	  
Figure 9: The VO Evolution Capabilities - User Management.
4.3.1 User Look-up VO List
The first capability allows a User registered to the Grid to list the set of VOs
currently available in that Grid. The request to obtain this list is submitted to
the VO Manager component of XVOMS. Upon receipt of the list of available
VOs, the User can then proceed to the next capability.
4.3.2 Requesting to Join VOs
This capability allows a User to request from the VO Manager (part of the
XVOMS) to join a specific VO (which is in the list of available VOs obtained in
the previous capability). This request is submitted via the VO Web Frontend
and it will be stored in a queue of similar requests ready for the next capability.
4.3.3 Approving User Requests
Upon receipt of a VO joining request from some User, the VO owner (also some
other User) will react by either approving or rejecting the request. If approved,
the requesting User will be added to the list of members of the VO (in the
XVOMS database). If not, the User is informed of the rejection outcome.
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4.3.4 Requesting to Remove from VOs
This capability allows a User, who is currently a member of a VO, to request
to be removed from that VO. The request is also submitted via the VO Web
Frontend. The request will then be queued for approval by the VO owner in the
next capability.
4.3.5 Removing Users from VOs
Once a request for removal from a VO is received, the VO owner will act to
approve the request. Hence, upon successful completion of this capability, the
requesting User is removed from the list of members of the VO in the XVOMS
database.
Resource Management. The second set of capabilities is related to the man-
agement of resources during the VO evolution phase, as shown in Figure 10.
	  
Figure 10: The VO Evolution Capabilities - Resource Management.
4.3.6 Manager Look-up VO List
The first capability, similar to the case of users management above, allows a
Resource Administrator whose RCA is registered to the Grid to look-up a list
of the VOs currently available in that Grid. The request to obtain this list
is submitted to the VO Manager component of XVOMS. Upon receipt of the
list of available VOs, the Resource Administrator can then proceed to the next
capability.
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4.3.7 Requesting to Add RCA to VOs
After looking-up the list of available VOs, the Resource Administrator will de-
cide on which VO to join the RCA. This is achieved by first submitting a request
via the VO Web Frontend or the command line interface to the VO Manager
system to join the selected VO. The preconditions to this capability are that
the VO must exist and the RCA of the Resource Administrator must have been
registered in the Grid. Once this capability is completed, the request is queued
waiting for the VO owner’s approval.
4.3.8 Approving RCA Requests to Join VOs
The VO owner can view the list of pending requests from RCAs (their adminis-
trators) to join his/her VO with the local VO Manager’s database. If approved
by the owner, the RCA is then formally part of the VO and can start adding
its resources to the VO.
4.3.9 Adding Resources to VOs
With this capability, a Resource Administrator can add their resource to a VO
by interacting via some interface with the RCA Server API. The resource added
must be capable of obtaining the VO machine attribute certificate issued by
the RCA server, which itself is a member of the VO. Once this capability is
successfully completed, Users can start utilising the resource in the operational
phase of the VO lifecycle.
4.3.10 Removing Resources from VOs
Similar to removing users from a VO, a Resource Administrator can simply
remove a resource from a VO, which is currently registered with that VO. As
a precondition, the resource should not currently be running any VO-relevant
computations or storing any VO-relevant data. Once this capability is executed,
it will not be possible any more to obtain the VO machine attribute certificate
of the resource and it will not be possible to utilise it in the context of the VO.
4.3.11 Requesting to Remove RCA from VOs
It is possible that at some stage, the Resource Administrator may request from
the VO Manager system to remove the RCA from a particular VO, either be-
cause the VO is no longer relevant or because the RCA cannot afford any more
to offer resources to the VO Users. This request is then queued for approval by
the VO owner.
4.3.12 Removing RCA from VOs
The VO owner will check during this capability the queue of pending requests
by RCAs wishing to be removed from VOs. For any such RCAs, the VO owner
may approve the request. This will result in the termination of the membership
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of the RCA to the specific VO. As a direct consequence, any resources belonging
to the domain of the RCA cannot any more join the specific VO.
4.3.13 Specifying Node Policies
The final capability when managing resources is to specify individual node poli-
cies. A node policy determines the conditions and rules under which the node
can be accessed and used by the VO Users. This capability is executed by
the Resource Administrator, and as a result, the existing policy on the node is
updated with the new VO policy.
Policy Management. The final set of capabilities is related to the manage-
ment of VO Policies as shown in Figure 11.
	  
Figure 11: The VO Evolution Capabilities - Policy Management.
4.3.14 Adding Resource VO Policies
The first capability is executed by the Resource Administrator on the VO Man-
ager component of XVOMS to add a VO policy that will be recorded with the
VO Policy Service (VOPS). This policy is at the VO level (enforced at the VO
level) and is directly relevant to the resource managed by the Resource Admin-
istrator.
4.3.15 Removing Resource VO Policies
This capability allows the Resource Administrator to remove a resource VO
policy from the VO Manager and the VOPS.
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4.3.16 Modifying Resource VO Policies
This capability allows the Resource Administrator to modify a resource VO
policy currently stored at the VO Manager and the VOPS.
4.4 VO Operation Capabilities
The previous sets of capabilities were concerned with setting-up the Grid and
creating VOs, at this stage, the VO moves to its operational phase. This phase
is represented by two capabilities, one for the Users and one for the RCAs.
VO Operation – User Capabilities. The first VO operation capability is
related to the manner in which Users can operate within a XtreemOS VO. This
is shown in Figure 12.
	  
Figure 12: The VO Operation Capabilities - Users.
4.4.1 Obtaining XOS Certificates for the User
The first capability allows a user to obtain a XtreemOS VO certificate from
the CDA server in order to be able to submit jobs to the VO resources. From
this point onwards, the User is verifiably identifiable and can hence start secure
communications with the VO resources. The users can obtain XOS certificates
via the VO Web Frontend, or via the CDA client.
VO Operation – RCA Capabilities The second capability is related to the
operational phase of the VO RCAs. This is shown in Figure 13.
4.4.2 Obtaining Attribute Certificates for the Resource Administra-
tor
The second capability here is to allow a Resource Administrator to obtain an
attribute certificate for the RCA in his/her administrative domain. From this
point onwards, any resources connected to the RCA and part of the VO can
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Figure 13: The VO Operation Capabilities - RCAs.
start accepting jobs from the VO Users. The Resource Administrator can obtain
Attribute Certificates via the RCA Web Frontend, or via console commands.
4.5 VO Termination Capabilities
The final set of capabilities in the XtreemOS VO lifecycle are related to the
termination of VOs, as shown in Figure 14. Since this is the last phase of the
lifecycle, all of these capabilities focus on the deletion of the various elements
of a VO and the cleaning-up of its final state.
4.5.1 Finding and Deleting VO Policies
The first capability is related to the location and deletion of any VO policies that
have been included on the VOPS server and that form part of the terminated
VO. This capability is carried out by the VO owner, who is responsible for
terminating his/her VO. Once this capability is carried out successfully, there
will be no more VO policies related to the terminated VO.
4.5.2 Finding and Deleting VO Users
The VO owner executes this capability to locate and delete the membership
of all the Users currently belonging to the terminated VO. The VO Manager
component of XVOMS will be updated accordingly.
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Figure 14: The VO Termination Capabilities.
4.5.3 Finding and Deleting VO RCAs
The VO owner executes this capability to locate and delete the membership
of all the RCAs currently belonging to the terminated VO. The VO Manager
component of XVOMS will be updated accordingly.
4.5.4 Informing RCA of Removal from VO
Once the previous capability is successfully completed, the VO Manager will also
inform the relevant RCAs of the decision to remove them from the terminated
VO. As a result, the RCA will no longer offer any resources to Users of the
terminated VO or any other activities.
4.5.5 Clean-up State
Once a RCA has been informed of the termination of a VO to which it belongs,
it will execute this capability to clean-up its internal state. This will include
removing the VO from its record of active VOs.
4.5.6 Deleting Attribute Certificates
In addition to cleaning-up its own internal state, the RCA will also be required
to revoke (delete) any attribute certificates belonging to its resources that certify
the membership of those resources in the VO. As a result of executing this capa-
bility, the relevant resources will no longer have any activities in the terminated
VO.
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4.5.7 Finding and Deleting VO Jobs
This capability is related to the location and deletion of all the current active
jobs in the terminated VO. The VO owner executes this capability on a different
XtreemOS service, called the Job Manager (part of the AEM services [2]).
4.5.8 Finding and Deleting VO Job Reservations
Finally, XtreemOS also facilitates the reservation of resource by prospective
Users in a VO in advance of the actual job allocation and execution. Therefore,
any such job reservations must also be removed from the VO during its termi-
nation phase. The capability, like the previous one, will also be executed by the
VO owner on the Reservation Manager component (part of the AEM services
[2]).
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The Grid operating system XtreemOS was developed with the aim of achieving
Grid/OS integration and thus allowing maximum transparency for Grid applica-
tions as well as Grid-unaware system tools and applications to be used without
being modified or even recompiled.
We presented in this paper the set of VO management and security capabil-
ities underlying the XtreemOS. One of the main aims of defining these capabili-
ties was to capture the VO management and security functionality requirements
at an early stage of the software development cycle in XtreemOS.
The design of these capabilities was laid out with several criteria in mind:
• Easy of use and management. The high degree of automation in these
capabilities by means of the use of various system components and the
availability of API (through command line and Web-based GUI) facilitates
an easier management task for the Grid and VO administrators.
• Dynamicity of VOs. One of the main requirements behind the XtreemOS
usage scenarios was to allow for a high degree of dynamicity in the struc-
ture of VOs. This implies the ability to change the composition of VOs
during application runtime, e.g. if certain computing resources fail. In
such circumstances, the unavailable resources need to be automatically
substituted by alternative resources including also a migration of the af-
fected running application components.
• Integrated security and trust management. The incorporation of the vari-
ous security-related (e.g. access control policy administration) and trust-
related (e.g. the public-key infrastructure) requirements in these capabil-
ities meant that security and trust formed an essential part of the early
software development lifecycle, rather than as an after-thought addition
to the system.
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The above criteria and others were derived from a range of 14 applications
[3] that formed the usage scenarios for the XtreemOS operating system. The
resulting capabilities were implemented in terms of the XtreemOS VO manage-
ment and security services outlined in Section 3.3.
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